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Abstract 
In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law 
enforcement procedures. A first contribution, of more general interest, is to clarify the 
concept of “legal uncertainty”, relying on ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, 
but formalising it by associating legal uncertainty with the information structure of what 
firms know about the process by which potentially harmful actions are treated by 
competition authorities. What firms know is clearly distinct, though influenced, from the 
decision errors made by authorities. We use this framework to show that information 
structures with legal uncertainty need not imply lower welfare than information structures 
with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different 
context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow 
and Shavell, 1992).  Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the 
analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare 
comparison of Per Se and Effects-Based legal standards.  In that analysis we considered 
just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties 
were exogenously fixed.  Here we allow (a) for different information structures under an 
Effects-Based standard and (b) for endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results. 
Under all information structures (including complete legal uncertainty) an Effects-Based 
standard dominates a Per Se standard.  Moreover, optimal penalties may be higher when 
there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.  These conclusions run 
counter to a number of prescriptions by legal scholars in the recent literature.   
 
JEL: K4, L4, K21, K23 
Keywords: competition law enforcement, penalties, legal uncertainty, competition policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely argued that, when deciding what type of procedures to use to enforce 
regulatory intervention in markets, an important consideration is the degree of legal 
uncertainty
4
  - the extent to which agents know, at the time they decide to take an action, 
what decision a regulatory authority will make as to whether to allow or disallow  (and 
possibly penalise) the agent’s action should it ever be investigated by the authority.  
Certain enforcement procedures are advocated in policy circles as being superior, ceteris 
paribus, because the legal uncertainty
5
 they generate is relatively low.   
While this issue is important for a very broad range of regulatory interventions
6
 here 
we frame our discussion and analysis in the specific context of competition policy / law 
and its enforcement.  Here discussions on legal uncertainty usually involve comparisons 
of Effects-Based
7
 enforcement procedures and Per Se enforcement procedures
8
. Under 
Per Se an entire class of actions is allowed (resp. disallowed), depending on whether 
their average harm
9
 is negative (resp. positive), whereas under Effects-Based procedures, 
the Competition Authority (CA) will investigate actions, and allow (resp. disallow) them 
if some estimate of their individual harm is negative (resp. positive)
10
. It is argued that 
under a Per Se rule firms are certain how their action will be treated if it ever comes 
                                                 
4 Legal scholars and social scientists have, of course, discussed the issue of legal uncertainty in a much 
wider context than that of economic regulation. Among early prominent authors, Max Weber, thought of 
legal certainty as necessary for capitalist progress – see discussion in D’Amato (1983) with extensive 
references to legal scholars including Posner (8
th
 edition, 2010).  For a discussion of the importance of legal 
certainty by a EU competition law expert, see Forrester’s (2000) account in the context of Competition 
Policy.  In Section 3 we provide a review of the extensive Law and Economics (mainly US) literature that 
has examined over many years various implications of legal uncertainty for law enforcement.  
5
 Or, lack of ability to predict the outcome of a legal dispute. D’Amato (1983) defines “legal uncertainty” 
as a “situation that obtains when the (legal) rule that is relevant to a given act or transaction is said by 
informed attorneys to have an expected official outcome at or near the 0.5 level of predictability”. For a 
recent extensive treatment by a legal expert see Kevin E. Davis (2011).  
6
 As has been recognised in the Law and Economics literature reviewed in Section 3. These include 
interventions associated with the application of Environmental Policy, determining eligibility for welfare 
benefits, Tax Compliance mechanisms, as well as, Competition Policy, Sectoral Regulation, etc. 
7
 Sometimes alternatively called discriminating or Rule-of-Reason procedures.  One can think of what in 
US is termed Rule–of–Reason as an extreme form of the Effects-Based approach under which competition 
authorities have the discretion to apply different economic methodologies and criteria on a case-by-case 
basis. For this last distinction see also Vickers (2007). 
8
   Often also referred to as object or form-based procedures. 
9
 Usually it is “harm to others” that is the adopted criterion, or a consumer surplus substantive standard is 
used (see also below). 
10
  This distinction is similar to the comparison between unconditional/rigid and conditional/flexible 
contracts.  In the context of welfare policy the analogous distinction is of universal and targeted benefits.  
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under scrutiny by a CA, whereas, under an Effects-Based approach, they do not know for 
sure what decision would be taken, and consequently this legal uncertainty induced by 
Effects –Based procedures should lead the CA to favour Per Se procedures. For example, 
in his classic article, after reviewing all the reasons why it is hard to have clarity as to the 
circumstances under which an action may in principle be harmful or benign, and the 
difficulties of obtaining data and carrying out the calculations required to implement 
whatever tests might be available, Easterbrook (1992) writes “Do we then abandon 
antitrust? Hardly! We should instead use more widely the method we apply to cartels: per 
se rules based on ordinary effects disdaining the search for rare counter-examples.”11  
The issue of legal uncertainty has attracted attention in recent years for another 
reason. Thus, legal experts have stressed that the increased tendency to use Effects-based 
procedures should have been associated with a reduction in the level (or even removal) of 
fines imposed, though the reverse has been the case. Thus Dethmers and Engelen (2011) 
note that “the European Commission recently imposed a record fine of 1.06 billion euro 
on Intel for having abused its dominant position by employing conditional rebates…. 
despite the adoption by the Commission of a more effects-based approach under art. 102 
(TFEU)
12” The authors go on to argue that from a legal perspective the imposition of 
fines requires that “the Commission and courts must present evidence of intent or 
negligence in accordance with the principle of nulla poena sine lege certa
13
. In terms of 
policy it does not make sense to impose such high fines for anti-competitive behaviors, 
which are not per se illegal…”14. 
In this paper we propose a formalisation to the concept of legal uncertainty which 
allows us to extend and generalise significantly our previous analysis Katsoulacos and 
                                                 
11
 The issue has gained even more in importance recently as CAs worldwide have adopted significant 
reforms in decision and enforcement procedures, with an increasing use of Effects-Based rather than Per Se 
procedures.  Examples include the adoption of a Rule-of-Reason standard for treating RPM in US, in the 
recent Leegin case (2007) – see for a discussion, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009) – and the reforms in the 
assessment of article 102 practices by EU and national authorities (see the Commission Guidance Paper, 
2008).  These have followed earlier reforms adopting Effects-Based assessment procedures in merger, 
vertical and certain horizontal agreement cases. See also Katsoulacos and Ulph (2011), Kokkoris and 
Lianos (2008), Will and Schmidtchen (2008). 
12
 Very high fines were imposed also in Microsoft and other recent cases – see for a review p. 86 – 89 of 
Dethmers and Engelen (2011). As the authors also note “The courts do not appear to impose any constraint 
on the Commission’s discretion” to impose very high fines – p. 91.  
13
 This Latin phrase may be translated as “no penalty unless there is certainty under the Law”. 
14
 Ibid. p. 98. 
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Ulph (K&U, 2009)
15
, in which we undertook an welfare comparison of Per Se and 
Effects-Based legal standards, assuming, for the latter case, a specific information 
structure that we now call Partial Legal Uncertainty. In addition, in K&U (2009) we 
assumed fixed penalties. Here we allow for different information structures under Effects-
Based procedures – namely what we will call No Legal Uncertainty and Complete Legal 
Uncertainty - and also we allow the competition authority to adjust penalties depending 
on both the legal standard that is employed and the information structure that prevails.
16
   
The model is set out in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss its relation to the existing 
literature. In Section 4 we establish the welfare levels under the different information 
structures and in Section 5 we establish and discuss our main results. In summary, these 
are as follows:   
1. Generally, when firms know their type17 (whether their actions are harmful or 
benign) but are uncertain about the CA’s potential assessment of these actions (so 
there is Partial Legal Uncertainty), welfare may be higher than when firms face 
no legal uncertainty (Proposition 1), this being certainly the case with optimal 
endogenously set penalties (Proposition 2). This result echoes a similar finding 
obtained in a completely different context and different assumptions in the earlier 
Law and Economics literature by Kaplow and Shavell (1992).   
2. Turning to a comparison of Effects-Based to Per Se legal standards, Effects-Based 
welfare dominates Per Se when in the former there is No Legal Uncertainty and 
may dominate Per Se when in the former there is Partial Legal Uncertainty 
(Proposition 1).  This last result is the result of K&U (2009) and K&U (2014) 
with exogenously set penalties. The intuition is that under Partial Legal 
Uncertainty there is a differential deterrence effect - the fraction of harmful 
actions deterred is greater than that of benign actions - and the conclusion will 
hold when this effect is strong enough. Further, under an Effects-Based legal 
                                                 
15
 See also Kwak (2010) that deals with related issues to those discussed here, concerning judicial errors 
and the choice of the liability standard. 
16
 As in K&U (2009), we ignore the potential cost advantage of decision-making under Per Se as compared 
to Effects-Based rules as an additional factor favouring Per Se.  This is readily incorporated and we have no 
new insights to offer on this issue. See Christiansen, A. and W. Kerber. (2008). 
17
 Or, state of the world (below we refer to this as the “environment”).  
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standard, No Legal Uncertainty and Partial Legal Uncertainty welfare dominate 
Complete Legal Uncertainty (Proposition 1). 
3. With optimally set endogenous penalties, there is an unambiguous welfare 
ranking of legal standards and information structures.  For a given Effects-Based 
procedure, welfare is higher when there is Partial Legal Uncertainty than it is 
with No Legal Uncertainty that is in turn higher than when there is Complete 
Legal Uncertainty
18
. Further the latter welfare dominates Per Se (Propositions 2a 
and 2b). 
4. Administrative effectiveness improves welfare under Complete Legal Uncertainty 
but not so under Partial Legal Uncertainty with optimally set penalties 
(Propositions 2c and 2d). 
5. Under an Effects-Based procedure the penalty chosen by the CA when there is 
Partial Legal Uncertainty will be higher than when there is No Legal Uncertainty 
and also higher than under the corresponding Per Se standard (Propositions 3a 
and 3d). The intuition is that legal uncertainty reduces the anticipated likelihood 
that an action will be disallowed and, to compensate for this and establish the 
desired deterrence level, the CA has to increase the level of penalties. 
6. When there is Complete Legal Uncertainty there are circumstances where the 
Competition Authority will want to have no deterrence and so set a zero penalty, 
while in others it will want to have deterrence in which case, for the reasons given 
above, it will set a higher penalty than under Partial Legal Uncertainty 
(Propositions 3b and 3c)
19
. Thus we find limited support for the legal principle of 
nulla poena sine lega certa. 
 
2. Basic Set Up - Modelling Legal Uncertainty  
 
2.1 Actions and Timing of Game 
                                                 
18
 As explained below, Complete Legal Uncertainty is the situation where both of the potential dimensions 
of uncertainty are present: firms do not know the true type of their actions and are also uncertain about how 
an error-prone authority will assess these actions were they to be detected and investigated. 
19
 These results on optimal penalties are entirely consistent with the Beckerian tradition (Becker, 1968) as 
we discuss in Section 5. 
6 
 
There is a population of firms of size 1 that could take a particular type of action – 
which is potentially prohibited under Competition Law. Nature initially decides the 
fraction of this type of action , 0 1    that comes from a Harmful (H) state of the 
world or environment. Actions from the H state of the world, that are not stopped by a 
CA, generate a social harm that is measured by the negative of the change in consumers’ 
surplus, and denoted by 0Hh 
20
. The remaining fraction of this type of action comes 
from a Benign (B) environment
21
, generating harm that we denote by 0Bh  . Let 
(1 )H Bh h h     be the average harm for this type of action. A type of action is said to 
be Presumptively Legal (resp.  Illegal)  if  0 resp.  0h h  . We assume that γ is 
common knowledge. 
In the absence of any intervention by a CA, taking an action will confer a private 
benefit b > 0 for the firm
22
. The distribution of b is independent of the environment from 
which the firm comes
23
. We suppose that the private benefit has a positive continuous 
probability density ( ) 0f b  on [0, )  with cumulative distribution function given by 
 , 0 ( ) 1; ( ) ( ) 0F b F b F b f b    .  
Given the fraction (or ex ante probability) of H and B environments, firms decide 
whether or not to undertake an action taking into account information about its true 
nature (H or B) as well as the presence of a CA and the latter’s enforcement and decision 
procedures. Finally, the CA if it detects an action, it investigates it and penalizes the firm 
taking the action if it considers it to be unlawful.  
 
2.2 Competition Authority Enforcement and Decision Procedures 
The CA detects and initiates enforcement procedures against a fraction 
, 0 1    of the actions taken.  These enforcement procedures include verifying that a 
                                                 
20
 This is the substantive standard used by most Competition Authorities – see Motta (2004) or O’Donohue 
& Padilla (2007) - and employed in our previous paper – K&U (2009).  It is the standard advocated by 
Salop (2010). It differs from a total welfare standard that would include the private benefit to the firm 
taking the action – advocated by Carlton (2007). The implications of using a total welfare standard are 
examined in K&U (2015). 
21
 Subsequently we will use the term “environment” to refer to the “states of the world” H or B.  
22
 Which we take to be the present value of the expected change in profits from the action over its ‘natural’ 
lifetime. 
23
 The “symmetry” assumption - see K&U (2009), which also discusses implications of its relaxation. 
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potentially anti-competitive action has been taken by the firm and, in the case of an 
Effects-Based decision rule, carrying out an investigation into its potential harm.  We 
refer to π as the coverage rate.  In addition we assume that it takes time for the Authority 
to complete these enforcement procedures and reach a decision.  We capture this through 
the fraction , 0 1   24 of the private benefit and social harm that accrue if the 
Authority decides to disallow the action. We refer to this as the delay.  We combine 
coverage rate and delay into a measure of the administrative effectiveness of the CA 
given by the parameter  1 , 0 1       .  
We assume that the decision rule used by the authority is to set liability standard
25
 
h  and then disapprove the action taken by firm k iff   
    ekh h  
where 
 
h
k
e  denotes signal received by the CA on the environment of firm k or the 
authority’s estimate of the harm caused by firm k. While in principle the liability standard 
may be positive negative or zero and while below we could permit the possibility that 
firms do not know the liability standard, since we are going to allow the possibility that 
one of the reasons why they may not know for sure what decision the authority will make 
in their case is that they don’t know what estimate of harm the authority will make, and 
since the decision rule depends simply on the difference between the estimate of harm 
and the liability standard, it will simplify the analysis if we assume that firms know the 
liability standard, and, furthermore that this is normalised so that 0h  . 
Given this we assume that the CA can use one of two decision procedures. 
Per Se   Here the CA allows all actions of a given type if that type is  
Presumptively Legal and disallows all actions if the type is Presumptively Illegal. 
Consequently, for any given type of action, only one type of decision error is made by the 
CA:  Type I (False Convictions) if the type of action is Presumptively Illegal and Type II 
(False Acquittals) if it is Presumptively Legal.  
                                                 
24
 For simplicity we assume in this paper that the delay is the same whatever legal standard is used.   
25
 That is, the threshold level of harm caused by an action such that if the authority perceives the harm 
caused by a firm’s action to be above this threshold it will disallow and penalise the action, while if the 
perceived level of harm is below this threshold then the authority will allow the firm’s action.   
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  Effects-Based   Under this procedure the CA undertakes an investigation of each 
action that comes before it, as a result of which it gets an estimate or a signal of the likely 
harm caused by the action.  This signal, which is only imperfectly correlated with the true 
harm, will be either: “Positive Harm” indicating that on the basis of the evidence 
obtained the CA thinks the action is likely to reduce welfare; or  “Negative Harm”,  
indicating that the action is likely to increase welfare.  The CA’s decision rule is to 
disallow an action if it gets a Positive Harm signal and allow it if it gets a Negative Harm 
signal.  
The quality of the CA’s estimate of harm is embodied in the parameters 
, 0 1B Bp p   - the probability that a Benign action generates a Negative Harm signal - 
and , 0 1H Hp p  - the probability that a Harmful action generates a Positive Harm 
signal.   We assume that the CA’s estimates have some discriminatory power so that 
1B Hp p  , so firms from the Harmful environment are more likely to generate a 
Positive Harm signal than are firms from the Benign environment, and vice versa
26
.    
We are interested in the question of whether legal uncertainty would ever be a 
reason for preferring a Per Se procedure to an Effects-Based one in situations where there 
was a prima facie reason to prefer to use Effects-Based, and we take that prima facie 
reason to be that the Effects-Based procedure has lower decision error costs
27
 than Per 
Se. In Katsoulacos & Ulph (2009) we establish the condition for this to be true, which we 
assume to hold here. Specifically, we make:   
ASSUMPTION 1 An Effects-Based Procedure Has Lower Decision-Error Costs 
(i) If  the action is Presumptively Legal – so (1 ) 0H Bh h h     -  then: 
  1
1
1
BH
B H
hp
p h


 
 

   (1) 
(ii) If  the action is Presumptively Illegal – so (1 ) 0H Bh h h      - then: 
                                                 
26
 Note that, as in K&U (2009) it is not necessary for the analysis that follows to use a more restrictive 
assumption such as that 
 
p
j
> (1/ 2), j = H , B  
27
 In Katsoulacos & Ulph (2009) we say that in this case the Effects-Based procedure can effectively 
discriminate. 
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  
1
1 1
B H
H B
p h
p h


 
  
   (2) 
 Assumption 1(i) guarantees that the average welfare of the actions that are 
disallowed will be negative, while 1(ii) guarantees that the average welfare of actions that 
are allowed is positive.  It is straightforward to show that if an action is Presumptively 
Legal then (1) implies (2), while if it is Presumptively Illegal then (2) implies (1).   So 
from now on we assume that both (1) and (2) hold
28
.  
Fines 
In general fines can take the form of a fixed penalty plus a component that is 
proportional to the private benefit, b , that is obtained by the firm 29 taking also account 
of the duration, δ, over which this benefit accrues owing to the delay in reaching a 
decision and stopping the action. The fixed component reflects the desire to link the 
penalty to the social harm that an anti-competitive action causes, while the proportional 
component reflects the desire to create deterrence by eliminating the private benefit of 
firms by acting anti-competitively. Formally our assumption is that if a firm with private 
benefit 0b   has its action disallowed after a delay, δ, it has to pay a penalty 
, 0, 0b      .  
 
2.3 Formalisation of Legal Uncertainty  
We assume that firms know whether the CA is using a Per Se or an Effects-Based 
procedure, and that, if it is Per Se, whether it is Per Se Legal or Per Se Illegal. When an 
Effects-Based procedure is used we make the assumption:  
ASSUMPTION 2   All firms know the parameters ,B Hp p .  Further, we assume 
that firms know the liability standard, 0h   
Here we propose an approach to the formalisation of legal uncertainty, which can 
be termed the information structure approach
30
. By information structure we mean what 
                                                 
28
 In expressions (1) and (2) the LHS captures the quality of the CA’s assessment while the RHS captures 
the “strength of the presumption of legality (resp. illegality)”.  See for details Katsoulacos & Ulph (2009). 
29
 There is an extensive literature on fines and law enforcement – see in particular the survey of Polinsky 
and Shavell (2000). For treatments that address fines under antitrust law see Buccirossi and Spangolo 
(2006), Wils (2006) and K&U (2013). 
30
 This, of course, relies on the main ideas introduced in the different strands of the existing literature, 
concerning the nature and sources of this phenomenon, to which we return below. 
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agents know about the factors that influence the outcome of the CA’s decision-making 
process. It is very important to distinguish what agents know about this process from the 
errors made in reaching decisions. What agents know, influences their perceived 
probability of being disallowed and it is on the basis of this perceived probability that we 
distinguish different information structures. 
To clarify the difference between this approach and one that associates legal 
uncertainty with decision errors we start by noting that decision errors made by the 
authority are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty. Thus: 
(i) It is not true that if there are no errors there will be no legal uncertainty.  This 
would only be true if also agents knew their type, that is, if they know the true 
value of the harm that their action causes to others.  
(ii) It is also not true that when there are errors there will be legal uncertainty. 
After all, as noted, it is common to consider as an advantage of Per Se legal 
rules, that they do not involve legal uncertainty but of course Per Se legal 
rules can involve a substantial amount of decision errors.   
Now, given our basic set-up and assumptions, firms’ perceived probability of 
having their actions disallowed would be influenced by: 
(i) Whether or not they know the true state H or B, or their true type – the true 
value of harm on others that their action generates. 
(ii) Whether or not they know the estimate of the harm of their action that the 
authority will make ( he , which depends on their understanding of exactly how 
the authority reaches its estimates of harm). 
Accordingly there are 4 logically possible information structures that can arise. 
(I) Firms know both whether their action is genuinely harmful or benign and also 
know whether, if investigated, it will be deemed to be harmful or benign. 
(II) Firms know whether their action is genuinely harmful or benign but do not 
know whether, if investigated,  it will be deemed to be harmful or benign. 
(III) Firms do not know whether their action is genuinely harmful or benign but do 
know whether, if investigated,  it will be deemed to be harmful or benign. 
(IV) Firms neither know whether their action is genuinely harmful or benign nor 
know whether, if investigated, it will be deemed to be harmful or benign 
11 
 
However, if firms know for sure whether or not their action will be deemed to be 
harmful or benign (cases (I) and (III)) it is not going to matter for either behaviour or 
welfare whether or not they know if their action is genuinely harmful. Consequently there 
are just three relevant information structures to consider: 
NLU)  No Legal Uncertainty    
Here firms know for sure whether, if investigated, their action will be deemed to 
be harmful or benign (they know the CA’s estimate31, he ) but may or may not know for 
sure whether their action is genuinely harmful or benign. This implies that a fraction 
Hp  
of firms from the Harmful environment will know for sure that their action will be 
disallowed, while the remaining fraction know for sure that it will be allowed.  Similarly 
a fraction Bp  of firms from the Benign environment will know for sure that their action 
will be allowed, while the remaining fraction know for sure that it will be disallowed
32
. 
PLU)    Partial Legal Uncertainty  
Here firms know for sure whether their actions are truly harmful or truly benign, 
but do not know for sure whether, if investigated, their action will be deemed to be 
harmful or benign (they do not know the CA’s estimate he ). However, all firms 
understand what is the distribution of errors in the authority’s estimates and this allows 
each firm to calculate the probability of being convicted if investigated given its type. 
Thus all firms from the Harmful environment know that there is a probability Hp  of 
having their action disallowed, while all firms from the Benign environment know that 
there is a probability Bp  of having their action allowed. 
CLU)   Complete Legal Uncertainty     
Here firms neither know for sure whether, if investigated,  their action  will be deemed to 
be harmful or benign nor do they know for sure whether their action is genuinely harmful 
                                                 
31
 This could arise if the CA set out the factors it would measure, the data it would use to measure these, 
and the calculations it would make, and if firms could costlessly access exactly the data the CA would use 
in its particular case and perform the calculations before it decided to take the action. 
32
 In contrast to the case of Partial Legal Uncertainty (below), under NLU firms of different type may face 
the same probabilities of being allowed or disallowed (convicted). Though in certain contexts this will be 
an unrealistic situation nevertheless it serves to make the point that even though the CA is using an Effects-
Based procedure there still could be no legal uncertainty and that variability of decision across otherwise 
identical firms does not necessarily imply that there is legal uncertainty.   
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or benign. We assume that here all firms assess the probability of conviction as 
 (1 ). 1H Bp p p     .   
For simplicity, in what follows we make the following additional assumption, 
though almost all our results go through without it
33
. 
ASSUMPTION 3  All firms face exactly the same type of legal uncertainty. 
 
2.4 Behaviour of Firms 
Clearly if a firm knows for sure that, if investigated, its action will be allowed by 
the CA, penalties are irrelevant, and it will take the action whatever the penalty.   
Consider then a firm that anticipates some positive probability , 0 1    of 
having its action banned/disallowed by the CA should it ever be investigated.  Since it 
anticipates a probability , 0 1    of being investigated, and a delay , 0 1    in 
having the decision to disallow taken, its expected net benefit from taking the action is  
     1 (1 )b        ,    
which we can write as 
      b             (3) 
where 
     
1
1 0 

 
     
 
34
    (4) 
.   There are then two cases.  If: 
(i)     ,  the firm cannot make a profit by taking the action, whatever the 
value of b  and  ψ;  
                                                 
33
 More precisely, if there were fixed but unknown fractions of firms facing different types of legal 
uncertainty, and if these were random subsets of the population of firms, then the welfare rankings of legal 
standards and of information structures that we derive in Section 4 will go through.  The only result that 
would change would be that the CA would set just one level of penalty – that which applies when there is 
what we call Complete Legal Uncertainty.    
34
 Since the parameters π  and  δ are constant throughout the paper, we have suppressed the dependence of  
 j on them and focused solely on its dependence on the probability of being disallowed, which varies 
across legal standards and information structures.  
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(ii)      then taking the action is profitable for all values of 
 
0b

 
 
 
. 
So the interpretation of   is that it is the critical value of the proportional 
component of the penalty above which all actions will be deterred, and below which 
some actions will be taken – potentially all if the penalty is purely proportional ( 0  ). 
This critical value is higher: 
 the lower is the probability of being investigated; 
 the lower is the probability of having the action disallowed if investigated; 
 the longer the delay in reaching a decision. 
This generalises the analysis appearing in typical treatments in the literature on law 
enforcement
35
, where the critical value depends typically on just the first of these factors 
- the probability of detection – since it is implicitly assumed that conviction rates are 1 
and there are no delays in decision-making.   
Notice also that the case where the action will certainly be allowed - 0   - can be 
handled as a special case of the above analysis by defining (0)   
Drawing this discussion together, we see that for a group of firms with an anticipated 
probability , 0 1    of having their action disallowed by the CA, the fraction (D) of 
firms deterred from taking the action under any given penalty regime ,   is: 
   
 
 
      if  
, ,
1                            if  
F
D

 
   
 
  
   
    

 
  (5) 
As we will see, it turns out that if the CA can choose the penalty, it will want to 
deter either all or none of the firms from such a group.  It can deter all firms by setting 
    and  0    , whereas it can deter none by setting     and  0    .  So, 
given our other assumptions, the CA can achieve its objectives by using penalties that are 
purely proportional to private benefit.  In what follows we assume that, when the CA can 
                                                 
35
 See, for example, the review article by Polinsky and Shavell (2000) or Buccirossi and Spangolo (2006). 
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choose its penalty, it will indeed always choose a purely proportional penalty
36
.  The 
dependence of the critical value of the penalty on the probability of an action’s being 
disallowed means that the penalty chosen will vary depending on both the legal standard 
in force and the information structure – the type of legal uncertainty.   
 
3. Relation to Existing Literature 
 
While one legal expert has noted that there is an “absence of rigorously defined 
yet practical measures of legal uncertainty”37, the concept, loosely defined as the lack of 
ability to predict the outcome of a legal dispute, has been subject to extensive discussion 
by economists and legal experts.  Calfee and Craswell (1984) offer an excellent informal 
review of early contributions, and, in a follow-up article – Craswell and Calfee (1986) - 
provide more formal analysis. They stress two potential sources of legal uncertainty.   
The first is uncertainty regarding the liability standard.  The second source of 
legal uncertainty, which has since received much more extensive attention in the 
literature
38
, arises because authorities are unable to determine the actual harm caused by 
an action and so have to form some estimate of the harm, and an action is disallowed if 
the estimated value of harm is above the liability standard.  Since these estimates contain 
errors this gives rise to possible Type I and Type II decision errors whereby actions that 
should be allowed are disallowed and actions that should be disallowed are allowed.   
 In their analyses, Craswell and Calfee (1984, 1986) examine welfare implications 
of the above considering more specifically how under-compliance and over-compliance 
are affected.
39
  Following Craswell and Calfee (1984, 1986), many papers in the Law and 
Economics literature have used models in which, as in our model above, agents that 
undertake privately beneficial but socially harmful actions can face uncertainty along two 
dimensions, specifically, either (a) because they do not know whether their actions are or 
                                                 
36
 The purely proportional assumption can also be justified by an appeal to a principle of proportionality – 
the CA uses the smallest penalty necessary to achieve its deterrence objectives. For a recent discussion of 
these issues see K&U (2013) and Huba H et.al (2013). 
37
 Davis (2011), p. 1.     
38
 For example, in the context of competition policy, Schinkel et.al. (2006), Kwak  J (2010) and Lang M 
(2012),  Also, in the context of the general Law and Economics literature, see references mentioned below. 
39
 Other analyses discussing implications of  decision / judicial errors include Kaplow (1994), Png (1986), 
Schinkel et.al. (2006) and Lang (2012), Schwartztein et.al (2012) and Immordino et.al. (2014). 
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are not harmful or/and (b) because they do not know how their actions will be treated by 
a social authority, the decisions of which are subject to errors. If actions are detected and, 
following an investigation, are found harmful they are subject to sanctions, also as in our 
model. This literature includes the important papers by Kaplow (1990), Kaplow (1995) 
and Kaplow and Shavell (1992). Kaplow (1990) examines the issue of optimal sanctions 
on agents that may be uncertain about whether their actions are harmful and thus 
sanctionable, though they may become perfectly informed at a positive cost. Specifically, 
the paper addresses three questions: if sanctions can be differentiated, is their optimal 
level the same for informed and uninformed agents? If sanctions must be the same, is the 
value of the optimal sanction affected by the presence of uninformed agents? And, when 
is it efficient for a tribunal to undertake the cost required in order to apply differential 
sanctions? Kaplow (1995) uses a similar setting, but with actions differing in their level 
of harm and examines the issue of whether it is welfare improving for a tribunal to 
undertake the cost of differentiating between actions of different harm by using more 
complex legal rules and setting different sanctions depending on the harm. Kaplow and 
Shavell (1992) uses a model closer in spirit than all other models in the literature to our 
model in the sense that agents face uncertainty because they may not know their true type 
or because of errors made in determining true harm by the social authority. Agents can 
obtain legal advice in order to eliminate both of these sources of uncertainty and the 
analysis examines whether the demand for such advice is socially appropriate. The 
analysis, although dealing with an issue (the demand for legal advice) completely 
different from the issues we are concerned with here and although, in most important 
respects, it utilises very different assumptions to those we utilise (see immediately below 
where we also interpret Kaplow and Shavell (1992) in terms of our framework), it leads 
to a result that seems to be an early precedent to one of the results also established below, 
namely that legal uncertainty may be welfare improving - Kaplow and Shavell (1992), 
Proposition 3
40
.  
                                                 
40
 Hylton (1990), extending Ordover (1978), could also be considered an early predecessor.  
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There are very important differences between all the above papers and the present 
paper
41
. So, in these papers the substantive standard used by the social authority for 
assessing whether an action is illegal is that of total welfare while we assume, as is much 
more natural in the context of competition law enforcement
42
, that the standard is that of 
consumer welfare. This is important given that the standard used influences in a critical 
way the deterrence objectives of the social authority and optimal penalties. Also, Kaplow 
(1990 and 1995) incorporate only one of the main dimensions of legal uncertainty – that 
related to agents not knowing their type. And, while Kaplow (1990) deals specifically 
with optimal sanctions, here we use a more general sanction structure that allows for both 
a penalty that is proportional to the private gain and a fixed part, to capture, respectively, 
both deterrence objectives and the objective to penalise the firm for the social harm its 
action causes, this structure also reflecting fining procedures in competition policy 
practice, while in Kaplow (1990) it is essentially assumed that there is a fixed penalty the 
optimal value of which is related to harm
43
. Furthermore, all three papers conflate the 
probability of being found illegal into a single number while it is important for our 
analysis to take explicitly into account that this probability is the product of two distinct 
probabilities, one of which is the probability of been detected to take a potentially 
harmful action and the other the probability that the authority, making decisions subject 
to errors, actually decides that the action is harmful. Finally, and very importantly, while 
in the context of the issues addressed by all the above papers it may be natural to assume, 
as the above papers do, that all potential actions undertaken by firms are non-benign
44
 
(implicitly assuming a probability of allowing benign actions to occur equal to one and 
                                                 
41
 There are even greater differences also, apart from those mentioned below, to another even earlier strand 
in the Law and Economics literature that deals with important private litigation issues (not examined here) 
in situations where individuals do not know the extent to which other people are negligent though they 
know the average degree of negligence. Thus Ordover (1978) examines the implications of costly litigation 
for compliance in these contexts while Hylton (1990) extends the Ordover analysis by introducing judicial 
errors in assessing negligence, showing that these reduce the likelihood of not getting perfect compliance 
equilibria (and thus can increase, in this sense, welfare). As we have emphasized, the judicial errors, the 
implications of which are examined in Hylton, are not, as in most of the other Law and Economics 
literature mentioned in the text, the same as the legal uncertainty examined in this paper – and are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the latter. 
42
 It is standard practice for CAs to use a consumer surplus substantive standard – see Salop (2010), though 
among economists there are strong voices against too (e.g. Carlton, 2007). 
43
 Note that interactions between the various differences in the assumptions mentioned here can also affect 
the results: e.g. it is easy to show that in Kaplow (1990), with a more general penalty structure the optimal 
structure depends on whether a total welfare or a consumer surplus substantive standard is assumed.  
44
 That is, they generate positive or zero (but not negative) harm.  
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thus neglecting Type I errors)
45
, this is certainly not the case for the sort of business 
practices dealt with by Competition Law, so in our framework we have to allow for 
actions that are either socially harmful or socially benign and to allow the authority’s 
decision errors to extend to its assessment of the latter type of actions
46
.  
In our proposed approach to the formalisation of legal uncertainty, based on the 
information structure of firms, legal uncertainty relates solely to what firms know about 
the decision that will be made should their action be investigated under a given decision 
procedure used by the CA.  Since the decision rule is fixed, so too are the associated costs 
of the Type I and Type II errors to which it gives rise, and the different information 
structures matter solely because of the different deterrence effects that they generate due 
to the different perceived probabilities of conviction to which they give rise.  A number 
of additional remarks are likely to be useful. 
If there is No Legal Uncertainty, amongst firms who will be convicted, those 
whose actions are more harmful perceive no greater probability of conviction than those 
whose actions are less harmful.  Similarly amongst firms whose actions will not be 
convicted. So, in that sense, there is no differential deterrence effect. While there is some 
statistical sense in which there is a differential deterrence effect at work – on average 
actions which are more harmful will be more likely to be deterred than actions that are 
less harmful, this does not happen at the level of individual firms. 
With Partial Legal Uncertainty, on the other hand, there is a strong differential 
deterrence effect since all firms whose actions are more harmful will face a higher 
probability of conviction than those whose actions are less harmful. Finally, under 
Complete Legal Uncertainty there is absolutely no differential deterrence effect since all 
firms perceive exactly the same probability of conviction.  As we show these generate 
important welfare consequences.  
 
                                                 
45
 An alternative way to put this is to say that Kaplow (1990) just deals with actions that in the terminology 
below, are presumptively illegal while we also have to consider presumptively legal actions. This also has 
serious implications for the results we get on optimal penalties under the different information structures.  
46
 An additional difference between the above papers and the present one is that we examine the important 
phenomenon of desistance, i.e. how delays in the authority’s procedures affects the outcomes.  Agents’ 
anti-competitive actions will normally take some time before they create benefits and social harm and so 
the size of these accruing will depend critically on delays in the authority’s procedures, which therefore 
will affect the value of optimal sanctions (see also, K&U, 2013).  
18 
 
Interpreting Kaplow and Shavell (1992) 
As mentioned above, in Kaplow and Shavell’s (1992) set-up agents also either do 
not know whether their action is harmful or are uncertain about the authority’s error-
prone decisions were their action to be investigated.  Using their terminology, agents can 
be “uninformed” because of either of these types of uncertainty. They can eliminate the 
uncertainty and become “informed” by getting “legal advice” at a cost. The paper 
examines whether the demand for legal advice is optimal. In terms of the framework used 
here, we can say that in Section 2 of their paper, agents’ information structure is one of 
Complete Legal Uncertainty
47
 and by getting legal advice they move to No Legal 
Uncertainty. In their Section 3, agents’ information structure is one of Partial Legal 
Uncertainty and by getting legal advice they move to No Legal Uncertainty. Proposition 
3 (in their Section 3) essentially establishes that getting legal advice and moving from 
Partial to No Legal Uncertainty is not socially optimal – removing uncertainty reduces 
welfare. As we noted above, this result is established on the basis of a completely 
different set of assumptions to those utilised in this paper
48
. Further, here we are also 
primarily concerned, unlike Kaplow and Shavell (1992), with a comparison between 
different enforcement procedures
49
.  With respect to this, note that while, as in Section 2 
of Kaplow and Shavell (1992) we find that moving from Complete to No Legal 
Uncertainty reduces welfare, we also show the important result that moving from an 
Effects-Based procedure with Complete Legal Uncertainty to a Per Se procedure can also 
reduce welfare.  
 
4. Outcomes Under Different Enforcement Procedures and Different 
Information Structures 
In this section we set out the levels of welfare under different enforcement 
procedures and, in the case of an Effects-Based procedure, under different information 
                                                 
47
 In this section, agents can be uninformed about whether their action is harmful and if they become 
informed they learn the true harm that is what the authority will determine if it undertakes an investigation.  
48
 The different issues examined in the two papers – demand for legal advice in Kaplow and Shavell (1992) 
vs. competition law enforcement here -can be considered responsible for the differences in assumptions.  
49
 And not just with a comparison across information structures. While comparing different enforcement 
procedures was the subject also of K&U (2009), as noticed above, in that paper the analysis was restricted 
to one information structure and only exogenous penalties.  
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structures. We do this for both the case where penalties are exogenous and the case where 
the CA chooses the optimal level of penalty.  
 
4.1 Effects-Based Procedure 
In this sub-section we assume that the CA uses an Effects-Based procedure, and 
that this has lower decision error costs than under the appropriate Per Se procedure, so 
both (1) and (2) hold.  We consider in turn different information structures.  
 
4.1.1 No Legal Uncertainty 
Here a fraction    resp.  1B Hp p  of firms from the Benign (resp. Harmful) 
environment know for sure that their action will be allowed and so will take it 
irrespective of the penalty.  The remaining firms from each environment know for sure 
that, if investigated, their action will be disallowed, albeit after a delay.  Since private 
benefit is uncorrelated with harm, then, for any given penalty, the same fraction    
    
 
 
0
      if  1
1
1                            if 1  
EB
F
D




  
   
    

 
 
of these firms will be deterred from taking the action.  Of those that take the action, harm 
will arise to the extent that only a fraction will be investigated, and, for those that are 
investigated, there will be a delay in reaching the decision to stop the action.  So the harm 
generated will depend on the administrative effectiveness, α.   Consequently welfare 
under a given penalty is: 
  
      
      
0
0
(1 ) 1
1 1 (1 ) 1
EB
B B H H
EB
H H B B
W h p h p
D h p h p
  
  
     
     
 (6) 
The first term captures the welfare arising from those who know for sure that their 
action will be allowed, while the second is the expected welfare arising from those who 
know for sure that their action will be disallowed. Since the CA’s rule is assumed to be 
able to effectively discriminate, actions that are allowed will on average be beneficial 
while those that are disallowed will on average be harmful.  Hence, from (1) and (2), both 
the expressions in curly brackets are positive.  This has two implications.  
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The first is that welfare is a strictly increasing function of administrative 
effectiveness, α.   
The second is that if the CA could choose the penalty, it would like to deter all those 
firms who know for sure their action will be disallowed from taking it, so it would set a 
penalty  
   0 0
1
ˆ ˆ1 1 , 0EB EB  

 
      
 
,   (7) 
giving rise to welfare: 
     0ˆ (1 ) 1 0EB B B H HW h p h p       .   (8) 
 
4.1.2 Partial Legal Uncertainty 
Here, while no firm knows for sure whether their action will be allowed or 
disallowed, firms know the liability standard and so know for sure whether their action is 
Harmful or Benign. Firms from the Harmful environment anticipate that, if investigated, 
there is a probability, Hp  of having their action disallowed, albeit after a delay, whereas 
firms from the Benign environment anticipate a lower probability 1 B Hp p   of an 
unfavourable decision by the CA. The fraction of firms from the Harmful environment 
that are deterred from taking the action is, 
 
 
 
 if  
1                          if  
HEBP
HH
H
F p
pD
p




  
   
    

 
, 
while the fraction from the Benign environment that are deterred is 
 
 
 
 if  1
1
1                              if 1  
BEBP
BB
B
F p
pD
p




  
    
     

  
. 
Note that since 1 1B Hp p   , then      1 1B Hp p    .  Consequently if 
the penalty is so severe that all firms from even the Benign environment are deterred – 
i.e.   1 Bp    -  then we will have 
0 1EBP EBP EBB HD D D   .   However if 
 1 Bp   it will be the case that 
0 1EBP EBP EBB HD D D   .     
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Whatever the penalty regime, welfare in this case is given by: 
          (1 ) 1 1 1 1 1EBP EBP EBPB B B H H HW D h p D h p               . (9) 
The first term gives the welfare arising from those firms from the Benign 
environment who take the action, taking account of the fact that a fraction  1 Bp   of 
this will not materialise since some firms will be investigated and have their action 
disallowed, albeit after a delay. The second term is the analogous expression for firms 
from the Harmful environment.  
If the CA can choose the penalty, it will want to ensure that NONE of the firms 
from the Benign environment are deterred, whereas ALL those from the harmful 
environment are deterred, and it can achieve this by setting a purely proportional penalty 
 
1
ˆ ˆ1 , 0EBP EBPH
H
p
p
  

 
      
 
,   (10) 
giving rise to welfare: 
      ˆ ( ) (1 ) 1 1 0EBP B BW h p          .   (11) 
Notice that this level of welfare is a strictly decreasing function of the administrative 
effectiveness (α) of the CA, since, because it is only firms from the Benign environment 
that are not deterred, welfare is higher the fewer of these are investigated and the longer it 
takes to curtail their action in the event that it is both investigated and disallowed. 
 
4.1.3 Complete Legal Uncertainty 
Once again, no firm knows for sure whether their action will be allowed or 
disallowed, so there is legal uncertainty. But, in this case, firms do not even know their 
type, so all firms anticipate the same probability  (1 ) 1H B Hp p p p       of having 
their action disallowed if investigated.  Accordingly the same fraction of firms  
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 from each environment will be deterred from taking the action.  If 
 
j <j p( ) so the 
penalty is sufficiently low that some firms do indeed take the action, then we will have 
1EBP EBC EBPB HD D D   .   
For any given penalty regime welfare is  
   1
EBC
EBC EBCW D W      (12) 
where 
  
     
  
( ) (1 ) 1 1 1
(1 ) 1
EBC
B B H H
H H B B
W h p h p
h h p h p
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  
        
        
 (13) 
is the average welfare generated by those firms which take the action when there is 
Complete Legal Uncertainty.  Given our assumption that the CA’s Effects-Based rule can 
Effectively Discriminate we see from (1) and (13) that the average welfare generated by 
those firms that take the action is a strictly increasing function of the administrative 
effectiveness of the CA, α, with 
    (0) ; (1) (1 ) 1 0
EBC EBC
B B H HW h W h p h p          (14) 
where the sign of (1)
EBC
W  follows from (2) and hence our assumption that the Effects-
Based rule can Effectively Discriminate.  
In considering the implications for the penalty that would be chosen by the CA, 
and the associated level of welfare, two cases arise:  
Case 1.  Positive Average Welfare  ( ) 0EBCW    
From (14) and (13) it is easy to see that a sufficient condition for this case to arise is that 
the action is Presumptively Legal  0h   .  In this case the CA will not want to deter any 
firm from taking the action, so the optimal penalty is: 
    ˆ ˆ0, 0EBC EBC        (15) 
and the associated level of welfare is: 
    ˆ ( ) ( ) 0
EBCEBCW W    .   (16) 
Case 2.   Negative Average Welfare,  ( ) 0EBCW    
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Once again it is straightforward to see from (13) and (14)  that a necessary condition for 
this to arise is that the action is Presumptively Illegal  0h  . In this case, the CA will 
want to deter all firms from taking the action in which case  
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=F p( ) = 1
p p
-1
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ +d , yˆ
EBC = 0   (17) 
and the associated level of welfare is: 
      W -
EBC
= 0.    (18) 
Taking the two cases together we see that, when the CA can set the penalty, welfare 
under an Effects-Based legal standard when there is Complete Legal Uncertainty is 
  
 
W
EBC
a( ) = MAX W
EBC
(a ),0{ }  .  (19) 
 
4.2 Per Se Procedure 
In this sub-section we assume that the CA uses a Per Se procedure whereby all 
actions will be either allowed by the CA if the action is Presumptively Legal or, if the 
action is Presumptively Illegal will certainly be disallowed (albeit with a delay) if the 
action is investigated by the CA. This is common knowledge so there is no legal 
uncertainty when such a legal standard is used.  To understand the implications consider 
in turn two cases. 
4.2.1 Presumptively Legal Actions  0h   
In this case all firms take the action whatever the penalty and the associated level of 
welfare is 
    0PSLW h   .    (20) 
Since penalties are irrelevant they can effectively be set to zero, so: 
     j
PSL
= 0, yˆ PSL = 0     (21) 
and, for completeness, welfare is: 
     W
PSL
= -h > 0 .    (22) 
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4.2.2 Presumptively Illegal Actions  0h   
In this case the same fraction of firms from both the Harmful and Benign environments 
will be deterred, namely   
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, 
and, of those who are not deterred, a fraction, π, will be investigated and have their 
actions disallowed after a delay, so welfare for any given penalty is: 
       1 1 0PSI PSIW D h      .   (23) 
This is a strictly increasing function of administrative effectiveness, α, since, if actions 
are on average harmful society is better off the higher the proportion investigated and the 
sooner they are stopped.   If the CA can choose the penalty it will want to deter all actions 
and so will set a penalty 
     0
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 , 0PSI EB PSI   

 
       
 
,  (24) 
giving rise to welfare 
      W
PSI
= 0 .    (25) 
So, in general, when the CA can choose the penalty, welfare under a Per Se procedure is  
    
 
W
PS
= MAX -h,0{ }.    (26) 
Remark 1 Inspection of the expressions for optimal penalties shows that:  
(a) Optimal penalties will be zero in all cases other than with Effects-Based under 
Partial Legal Uncertainty when administrative effectiveness is perfect (α = 1, i.e. π 
= 1 and δ = 0).  
(b) Optimal penalties will be positive even with perfect detection (π = 1) for as long 
as there are delays in decision making (δ > 0). This will be true even under a Per 
Se Illegality rule (see expression (24)). 
 
5. Welfare Comparisons and Optimal Penalties: Main Results 
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In this section we compare welfare under different procedures and information 
structures.  We start, for later reference, with a result for the case where penalties are 
exogenously fixed.  
Proposition 1 As established in K&U (2014): 
(i) If there is No Legal Uncertainty then an Effects-Based legal standard welfare 
dominates a Per Se legal standard. 
(ii) Welfare can be higher under Partial Legal Uncertainty than under No Legal 
Uncertainty.  If Partial Legal Uncertainty welfare dominates No Legal 
Uncertainty then a  fortiori  it  welfare dominates Per Se. Even if welfare is 
lower under Partial Legal Uncertainty than under No Legal Uncertainty it 
may still be higher than under Per Se
50
.   
(iii) Partial Legal Uncertainty and No Legal Uncertainty welfare dominates 
Complete Legal Uncertainty. However, although an information structure in 
which there is Complete Legal Uncertainty is the worst information structure 
for an Effects-Based legal standard, there are conditions under which it 
welfare dominates the outcome under a Per Se legal standard.  This result is 
strengthened with endogenous penalties.  
Next, we compare the levels of welfare if penalties are not fixed but can be chosen by 
the CA to achieve its objective given the legal standard and information structure.  We 
also compare optimal penalties across both legal standards and information structures.  
Before undertaking these comparisons we note that in a First-Best world with costless 
perfect information, the CA would be able to investigate all actions, accurately and 
distinguish Harmful and Benign actions; instantly disallow the former while allowing the 
latter.  All Harmful actions would therefore be deterred and all Benign actions allowed 
generating a First-Best welfare level  
 (1 )FB BW h   .       (27) 
Turning to the second-best world comparisons we will, for the sake of efficiency in 
presenting the results, show that the worst information structure under effects-based is 
not worse than Per Se, thus establishing that effects-based is always better than Per Se.  
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 See K&U (2009) for an extensive analysis and discussion of the conditions under which an Effects-Based 
legal standard with Partial Legal Uncertainty welfare dominates Per Se. 
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 Welfare Comparisons 
The following inequalities follow immediately from (8), (11), (13), (19), (26) and (27):  
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 (28) 
This establishes the following: 
Proposition 2 When the CA can choose the appropriate penalty then there is a clear 
welfare ranking of information structures and legal standards.  In particular: 
(a)  With an Effects-Based legal standard Partial Legal Uncertainty strictly 
dominates No Legal Uncertainty. Thus, with endogenous penalties, 
Proposition 1 is substantially strengthened. No Legal Uncertainty dominates 
Complete Legal Uncertainty – thus, the latter is the worst situation under 
Effects-Based. 
(b) An Effects-Based legal standard with Complete Legal Uncertainty welfare 
dominates a Per Se legal standard. Given (a) this implies that Effects-Based is 
always better compared to Per Se. 
(c) Under an Effects-Based legal standard with Partial Legal Uncertainty welfare 
is a strictly decreasing function of administrative effectiveness, 
 1 , 0 1       , with the First-Best level of welfare being attained 
when 0  51. 
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 See discussion in sub-section 4.1.2 above for the intuition of this result.  
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(d) Under an Effects-Based legal standard with Complete Legal Uncertainty 
welfare is a strictly increasing function of administrative effectiveness, α, 
achieving the same welfare as with No Legal Uncertainty when 1  and the 
same welfare as under Per Se when 0  . 
These results are also illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b (see below).  
 
First Best Dominates Partial Legal Uncertainty  
When there is Partial Legal Uncertainty the CA can exploit the fact that firms 
know their type and the fact that, since its rule has discriminatory ability, fewer firms 
from the Benign environment will be disallowed than from the Harmful environment, to 
set a penalty that ensures no Harmful actions are taken while all Benign actions are taken, 
even though some of these may subsequently be investigated and stopped, albeit after a 
delay.  The CA thus completely separates Benign from Harmful actions. If administrative 
effectiveness is zero all Benign actions are effectively allowed and the First-Best is 
attained. When administrative effectiveness is positive some Benign actions are 
ultimately stopped so welfare falls the greater is administrative effectiveness. 
 
Partial Legal Uncertainty Strictly Dominates No Legal Uncertainty 
There are two reasons why this result holds.  First, with Partial Legal Uncertainty 
ALL Harmful actions are deterred, whereas, under No Legal Uncertainty, some firms 
from the Harmful environment will take the action knowing for sure that, given the CA’s 
imperfect assessment, they will subsequently be allowed. Second, under No Legal 
Uncertainty, knowing for sure that they will subsequently be disallowed, a fraction of 
Benign actions will be deterred.  This will be greater than or equal to the fraction of 
Benign actions that, though undeterred, will be stopped following an investigation under 
Partial Legal Uncertainty.
52
    
 
No Legal Uncertainty Dominates Complete Legal Uncertainty.   
                                                 
52
 The fraction of Benign actions  taken when there is No Legal Uncertainty  will be the same as under 
Partial Legal Uncertainty only when there is complete administrative effectiveness.  
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There are two cases to consider.  The first is where, under Complete Legal 
Uncertainty, the average welfare were all firms to take the action is negative
53
 and 
consequently the CA would set a high penalty that deters ALL firms from taking the 
action, generating zero welfare.  But then No Legal Uncertainty generates higher welfare 
since those firms that know for sure that their action will be allowed will take it and, on 
average, they generate positive welfare.  The second case is where, under Complete Legal 
Uncertainty, the average welfare if all firms take the action is positive
54
, and 
consequently the CA will set a zero penalty and so deter no actions. But now welfare 
with Complete Legal Uncertainty is a strictly increasing function of administrative 
effectiveness since the only thing that reduces the harm created by firms taking the action 
are the decisions of the CA, and, given it can effectively discriminate, the more actions it 
can get its decision-making ability to bite on and the faster it reaches its decision the 
higher is welfare.  When there is complete administrative effectiveness and so all actions 
are investigated and decisions reached instantly, the remaining actions that are allowed 
will be exactly the same as those arising from those firms who know for sure their action 
will be allowed under No Legal Uncertainty.  
 
Effects-Based Standards with Complete Legal Uncertainty Dominate Per Se 
If the action is Presumptively Illegal then under Per Se the CA will set a penalty 
that will deter all actions. However this will happened under an Effects-Based standard 
with Complete Legal Uncertainty only if, in addition, administrative effectiveness is low.  
In this case both procedures produce zero welfare.  However when the action is 
Presumptively Illegal but administrative effectiveness is sufficiently high, then, as we 
have seen, under an Effect-Based standard with Complete Legal Uncertainty the CA will 
want to set a zero penalty so no actions are deterred, but it then uses its ability to 
Effectively Discriminate to allow predominantly Benign actions so producing positive 
welfare.  When the action is Presumptively Legal the CA will set zero penalties under 
both a Per Se legal standard and under an Effects-Based legal standard with Complete 
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 This arises only if the action is Presumptively Illegal and the degree of administrative effectiveness is 
low. 
54
 This will arise either if the action is Presumptively Legal or if it is Presumptively Illegal but there is a 
sufficiently high degree of administrative effectiveness.   
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Legal Uncertainty.  But then in both cases all actions will be taken.  However the power 
of the Effects-Based procedure to Effectively Discriminate will produce lower decision-
error costs and so higher welfare.   
Remark 2  What this discussion brings out very clearly is that under an Effects-
Based legal standard the CA can prevent actions either by deterrence – stopping them 
ever being taken – or desistance – investigating and stopping (possibly after a delay) 
those that have been taken – and that, through a careful choice of penalties, the balance 
between these two modes will shift in subtle ways depending on the informational 
structure and hence the extent of Legal Uncertainty faced by firms.  Under a Per Se legal 
standard, if the action is Presumptively Illegal  the CA makes it clear that any action that 
is taken will be stopped and combines this with a penalty that deters all actions.  Whereas 
if the action is Presumptively Legal the CA neither deters nor desists any action. It is this 
much cruder nature of a Per Se standard that makes it unambiguously worse that an 
Effects-Based standard – whatever the degree of Legal Uncertainty.  
 
5.2.2  Comparison of Optimal Penalties 
From (7), (10), (15), (17), (21), and (24) we have the following inequalities: 
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  
  (29) 
This establishes the following: 
Proposition 3    Under an Effects-Based legal standard, the optimal penalty chosen by the 
CA will be
55
: 
(a) higher when there is Partial Legal Uncertainty than when there is No Legal 
Uncertainty 
(b) higher still when there is Complete Legal Uncertainty and average welfare if all 
firms take the action is negative; 
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 Throughout this discussion we are assuming that there are no constraints to optimally set penalties e.g. 
constraints due to legal principles, such as that of “proportionality”. 
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(c) zero if there is Complete Legal Uncertainty and average welfare if all firms take 
the action is positive; 
(d) higher under Effects-Based with Partial Legal Uncertainty than under Per Se for 
both presumptively legal and presumptively illegal actions; 
(e) equal under Effects-Based with No Legal Uncertainty than under Per Se for 
presumptively illegal actions and higher under Effects-Based with No Legal 
Uncertainty than under Per Se for presumptively legal actions. 
Thus in situations where there is legal uncertainty the appropriate penalty may be 
higher than when there is no legal uncertainty, though there is one class of cases where 
the appropriate penalty under Complete Legal Uncertainty is indeed zero. While this 
latter result is certainly consistent with the principle of nulla poena sine lega certa as 
advocated by Dethmers and Engelen (2011) and other legal scholars, there is no general 
support for this principle. 
Remark 3  It is worth stressing that these results are entirely consistent with the 
Beckerian tradition on optimal penalties. As Becker (1968) had first noted the optimal 
penalty is higher when uncertainty is introduced in the form of imperfect detection. Here 
we show that if there is increased uncertainty in the form of imperfect understanding 
about how actions will be treated if investigated by a CA (the form of uncertainty that has 
preoccupied legal writings) this may raise optimal penalties – though this will not always 
be the case. As shown, this result holds also when there detection is perfect (π = 1).  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we have proposed a formalisation to the concept of “legal 
uncertainty” and have set this out in the context of competition policy, but the framework 
can apply more widely. Our approach identifies legal uncertainty purely with the 
information structure of what a firm knows about the process by which a CA would reach 
a decision should an action that the firm has taken be investigated by the authority. As 
such, legal uncertainty is distinct from the phenomenon of decision errors made by the 
authority, which are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty. 
We distinguish three information structures with no legal uncertainty, partial legal 
uncertainty and complete legal uncertainty.. We compare these different information 
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structures between themselves and with Per Se procedures and also compare penalties 
across different procedures and information structures. 
Our analysis offers important grounds for scepticism about arguments coming 
mainly from legal experts, that Effects-Based procedures are less attractive than Per Se 
because of the Legal Uncertainty that they entail and that, if adopted, should involve 
much lower penalties according to the legal principle of nulla poena sine lege certa. Two 
important policy lessons emerge in particular from the analysis above.  
 First, enforcement procedures involving legal uncertainty may be welfare superior 
to those without any legal uncertainty because of their better deterrence effects. This is 
most likely when legal uncertainty arises because, although firms know their type, they 
cannot predict what the Competition Authority will decide in their case. Thus a decision 
by policy makers not to adopt Effects-Based procedures cannot be based solely or even 
mainly on arguments relating to the legal uncertainty of such procedures.  
Second, the superiority of Effects-Based procedures is enhanced when 
Competition Authorities use penalties to achieve optimal deterrence effects. In that case it 
is never optimal to use Per Se. This is because under an  Effects-Based legal standard the 
CA can prevent actions either by deterrence – stopping them ever being taken – or by  
desistance – investigating and stopping (possibly after a delay) those that have been 
taken. Under a Per Se legal standard, if the action is Presumptively Illegal the CA makes 
it clear that any action that is detected and investigated will be stopped and, to counter the 
risk of not being detected, combines this with a penalty that deters all actions.  Whereas if 
the action is Presumptively Legal, the CA neither deters nor desists any action.  It is this 
much cruder nature of Per Se procedures that makes them unambiguously worse that 
Effects-Based procedures whatever the type of Legal Uncertainty – a conclusion that runs 
directly counter to that proposed by many legal experts.   
Finally, and more practically, our analysis shows that CAs may well be justified 
in raising their penalties after adopting Effects-Based procedures. 
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